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The Doctrine of Equivalents: Rarely Actionable
Non-Literal Infringement or the Second Prong of
Patent Infringement Charges?
The doctrine of equivalents is an important doctrine in patent law. The
equitable doctrine of equivalents gives a patentee a second chance to protect a
claimed invention when an accused infringer's device does not literally
infringe, but performs the same function in the same way to achieve the same
result. This Note addresses the concern of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit that the doctrine of equivalents may become the second
prong of every patent infringement charge and concludes that the doctrine of
equivalents should indeed be the second prong of every patent infringement
charge.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Constitutional Basis
The United States Constitution expressly grants to Congress the power
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries; . . . ."I Congress implemented this power by granting to
patentees2 the right to "exclude others from making, using, or selling the
[patented] invention throughout the United States" for a period of seventeen
years. 3 That is, a patentee may prevent others from infringing the claims of the
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2 Inventors may obtain a patent. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). An inventor is "[w]hoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof. ... " Id. To be patentable, an
invention or discovery must be, inter alia, "novel[ ]," 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988), and "non-
obvious," 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
3 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). This confers broad rights, but is not a total bar to
interference:
[A] patent confers an exclusive right upon the patentee, limited in those terms. He may
prevent any one from making, selling, or using a structure embodying the invention,
but the monopoly goes no further than that. It restrains every one from the conduct so
described, and it does not restrain him from anything else. If, therefore, any one says to
a possible customer of a patentee, "I will make the article myself; don't buy of the
patentee," while he may be doing the patentee a wrong, and while equity will forbid his
carrying out his promise, the promise itself is not part of the conduct which the patent
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patent for a period of seventeen years. A patentee may sue anyone who
commits patent infringement. 4 After this seventeen year period expires, anyone
may make, use or sell the invention;5 the invention is in the "public domain." 6
Thus, a quid pro quo exists between the patentee and the people: the patentee
has the exclusive right to prevent others from making, using, and selling the
patented invention for seventeen years, after which the invention enters the
public domain. The patentee gets the protection needed for the invention. The
people get the benefit of the patented knowledge after the patent expires.
This system clearly "promote[s] the Progress of Science and useful Arts" 7
by inducing inventors to disclose their inventions to the public.8 The inventor
forbids; it is not a "subtraction" from the monopoly. If it injures the plaintiff, though
never performed, perhaps it is a wrong, like a slander upon his title, but certainly it is
not an infringement of the patent.
Paper Converting Machine Corp. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 16, 223
U.S.P.Q. 591, 594 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (quoting Van Kannell Revolving Door Co. v.
Revolving Door & Fixture Co., 293 F. 261, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1920)).
4 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1988).
5 In general, this is true. However, other may make, use, or sell the items covered by
the patent claims only if the subject matter is not covered by another valid patent.
Should there be such other [dominating] patents still in force when a patent
expires, the monopoly of the expiring patent is not 'extended'; that monopoly ends and
any other patents which may affect the rights of the public to use something the expiring
patent discloses stand on their own legal foundations. The expiration of a patent right is
not a guarantee of a right to use.
Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. Northern Petrochem. Co., 784 F.2d 351, 357, 228
U.S.P.Q. 837, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (emphasis added) (quoting In re Heinle, 342 F.2d
1001, 1005, 145 U.S.P.Q. 131, 135 (C.C.P.A. 1965)).
6 E.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989)
("We have long held that after the expiration of a federal patent, the subject matter of the
patent passes to the free use of the public as a matter of federal law.") (citations omitted);
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 495 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("[E]very article not covered by a valid patent is in the public domain."); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964) ("[When the patent expires the monopoly
created by it expires, too, and the right to make the article-including the right to make it in
precisely the shape it carried when patented-passes to the public.") (citations omitted);
Compco Corp. v. Day-Bright Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964).
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8 "The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
[Vol. 53:14211422
PATENT INFRINGEMENT CHARGES
trying to prevent others from making, using, or selling an invention has a
choice between alternatives: the inventor can either (1) hide the invention and
treat it as a trade secret, or (2) secure these protective rights by obtaining a
patent. If the inventor chooses the secrecy option, society loses out because the
invention may remain a mystery. Furthermore, choosing the secrecy option is
not very safe for the inventor. Trade secret laws offer a great deal of
protection; however, the benefits of trade secret laws are usually forfeited if the
secret is revealed. 9 For example, if the inventor makes, uses, or sells the
invention, the secret may be revealed through reverse-engineering, causing the
secrecy-based protection to fail. On the other hand, choosing the patent option
gives the inventor the desired protection. By obtaining a patent, the inventor
may exclude others from making, using, and selling the invention, thereby
acquiring the power to prevent any infringement. This inducement to obtain a
patent ultimately allows the body of public domain knowledge to grow, thereby
"promot[ing] the Progress of Science and the useful Arts." 1°
B. Basics of Patent Claim Infringement
The "claim(s)" of a patent are a critical aspect of the quid pro quo between
the public and the patentee outlined above. The patent claims define the metes
and bounds of the invention.11 That is, the patent claims set forth what the
patentee has an exclusive right to exclude others from making, using, and
selling.12 Consequently, the patent claims define what may be made, used, or
sold by the public after a patent expires. 13 Patent claims may be conveniently
thought of as being made up of "elements" or "limitations." Each element or
limitation of a claim narrows (i.e., limits) the subject matter of the claim.
Two forms of patent infringement exist: literal infringement and
infringement by equivalents. In literal infringement, the accused device,
'Science and useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve
rewards commensurate with the service rendered." Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954).
9 The trade secret laws of most states are based on either the Uniform Trade Secret Act
or § 757 of the Restatement of Torts. See generally MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW
§§ 3.01-.04 (1988). Both types of protection fail if the secret is revealed to the public. Id.
For example, in Texas, the only requirement for trade secret protection is that the trade
secret is truly secret. Id. § 3.04.
10 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
11 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
12 See 6 ERNEST B. LipscOM m, LipscoMn's WALKER ON PATENTS § 22:2 (3d ed.
1987).
13 For clarification, see supra notes 5 & 6 and accompanying text.
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substance, or process infringes a patent claim if the patent claim "reads on" the
accused device, substance, or process. That is, if all the limitations of the
patent claim are found in the accused device, substance, or process, then the
accused device, substance, or process literally infringes the patent claim.
Conversely, if the patent claim does not literally read on the accused
device, substance, or process, then there is not literal infringement. However,
if the accused device, substance, or process "performs substantially the same
overall function or work, in substantially the same way, to obtain substantially
the same result as the claimed invention," 14 then that accused device,
substance, or process may15 infringe the claims of the patented invention. This
is infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
Technically, the doctrine of equivalents does not expand the coverage of
the claims, it just expands the patent holder's right to exclude "equivalents" of
what is claimed. 16 However, whether the claim is expanded to encompass
unclaimed material, or the unclaimed material is brought within the scope of
the claim, the effect is the same: a device, substance, or process which does not
literally infringe the patent claims is held to infringe. Thus, the boundary
between the claimed material and the prior art is moved. That is, the patentable
area between the claimed material and the prior art shrinks.
C. Purpose and History of the Doctrine of Equivalents
The Supreme Court's latest opinion covering the doctrine of equivalents is
in Graver Tank & Mfg. v. Linde Air Prod. Co.17 The Graver Tank Court
defined the purpose of the doctrine in terms of protecting patentees from
14 Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934-35, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
1737, 1739 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988) (citing Graver
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328, 330
(1950); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 901-02, 221
U.S.P.Q. 669, 679 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 857 (1984)).
15 "The doctrine of equivalents is limited in that the doctrine will not extend (1) to
cover an accused device in the prior art, and (2) to allow the patentee to recapture through
equivalence certain coverage given up during prosecution." Pennwalt Corp., 833 F.2d at
935 n.1, 4 U.S.P.Q. at 1739 n.1 (citing Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870,
228 U.S.P.Q. 90, 96 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
16 Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 684, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d 1942, 1948 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
17 339 U.S. 605, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328 (1950).
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"piracy," "fraud," and "stealing."' 8 When establishing literal infringement, a
patentee must demonstrate that every limitation of the disputed claim is found
in the accused device. 19 Thus, if only one claim limitation is missing from the
accused device, then the literal infringement charge fails. This rule is as harsh
as it seems. Seemingly, a competitor could make a very slight change, placing
the other device just outside the literal scope of the claims, and thereby escape
literal infringement. The doctrine of equivalents was developed to temper the
harshness of the application of the literal infringement doctrine. If the doctrine
of equivalents did not exist, we would have to invent it.
The doctrine of equivalents is a very old doctrine. The pioneering case of
Winans v. Denmead,20 decided in 1853 by the United States Supreme Court, is
usually cited as originating the doctrine.2 1 In Winans a patent was taken out for
making "the body of a burden railroad car, made of sheet iron, the upper part
being cylindrical, and the lower part in the form of a frustum of a cone."22 The
major benefit of this patent was that railroad cars made under this patent could
carry a much higher weight of cargo as a percentage of car weight. Previous
railroad cars could carry roughly their weight in cargo; cars made under the
patent could carry almost four times their weight in cargo. 23 The defendant in
Winans desired this benefit and sent a draftsman to the plaintiff's shop, where
the draftsman took enough measurements to virtually duplicate plaintiffs
railroad car.24 Defendant then made a railroad car with the same beneficial
18 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 612, 85 U.S.P.Q.
328, 330 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting).
19 E.g., London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1539, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d
1456, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("There can be no infringement as a matter of law if a claim
limitation is totally missing from the accused device.") (citing Becton Dickinson & Co. v.
C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 798, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1097, 1101 (Fed. Cir. 1990));
Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
20 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
21 E.g., Pennwalt Corp., 833 F.2d at 946, 960, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1749, 1760 (Bennet,
Sr. I., dissenting in part; Newman, J., commentary), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
Although Winans is usually cited as the origin of the doctrine, it probably had its roots much
earlier. E.g., Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas. 1015, 1016 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No. 5,718) ("[A]s
a general rule, . . . where [a claimed device and an accused device] are substantially the
same, and operate in the same manner, to produce the same result, they must be in
principle the same.") (charging jury).
22 Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 339.
23 Id. at 331.
2 4 Id. at 332.
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increase in hauling capacity. The only difference between the two cars was that
plaintiff's was nominally cylindrical and conical25 and defendant's was
octagonal and pyramidal. 26 The patentee only claimed the cylindrical railroad
car.27 Therefore, the defendant's car could not literally infringe the claims of
the patent, as the trial court held.28 However, on these facts, the Winans Court
reversed the trial court's finding of no infringement, because the defendant's
railroad car was "substantially the same" as the plaintiffs. 29 Thus, the doctrine
of equivalents was born.
Two clearly competing policies are at work in every infringement by
equivalents case. These policies have corresponding functions in the patent
system and may be labeled (1) the "notice to the public function" and (2) the
"protect the patentee function." The first policy, as stated by the Federal
Circuit in London v. Carson Pirie Scott & C0.,3° is that:
On the one hand, claims must be "particular" and "distinct," as required by 35
U.S.C. § 112, so that the public has fair notice of what the patentee and the
Patent and Trademark Office have agreed constitute the metes and bounds of
the claimed invention. Notice permits other parties to avoid actions which
infringe the patent and to design around the patent.3 1
Thus, the requirement of particularity and distinctness of claims fulfill the
"notice function" of the patent system, allowing the public to know what may
be safely used.32
25 Id. at 339.
26 Id. at 340.
27Id. at 342.
2 8 Id. at 330.
29Id. at 340.
30 946 F.2d 1534, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (affirming a decision granting
summary judgment of non-infringement in favor of defendants).
31 Id. at 1538 (citing State Indus. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed.
Cir. 1985)).
32
The limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee, the
encouragement of the inventive genius of others, and the assurance that the subject of
the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public.... The inventor must "inform the
public during the life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted, so that it may
be known which features may be safely used or manufactured without a license and
which may not."
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The second policy is the constitutionally mandated policy of protecting the
patentee. Patentees must have confidence in the system: "On the other hand,
the patentee should not be deprived of the benefits of his patent by competitors
who appropriate the essence of an invention while barely avoiding the literal
language of the claims." 33 This is the constitutionally-mandated "protect the
patentee function" of the patent system. The second policy is stated by the
United States Supreme Court in Graver Tank as follows: "The essence of the
doctrine [of equivalents] is that one may not practice a fraud on a patent." 34
Of the two functions, it is believed that the "protect the patentee" function
is slightly more important and should be given slightly more weight when a
court balances the two or is forced to choose between the two. First of all, the
"protect the patentee" function is constitutionally mandated. A simple example
shows the slight edge of the "protect the patentee" function. The grant of
power is "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" 35 by protecting
inventors' works. If patentees have a great deal of confidence in the patent
system, yet the public loses confidence in patent claims to aid in deciding
whether their acts infringe or not, then inventors will continue to patent, and
General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938) (footnotes
omitted).
The object of the patent law in requiring the patentee to "particularly point out and
distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention
or discovery," is not only to secure to him all to which he is entitled, but to apprise the
public of what is still open to them.
McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891).
The doctrine of equivalents does not authorize judicial revision of the basic invention;
the interested public must know with reasonable precision the boundaries of the patent
grant.
Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1542, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d
1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Newman, J., dissenting).
33 London, 946 F.2d at 1538, 20 U.S.P.Q. at 1458 (citing Laitram Corp. v.
Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 863 F.2d 855, 856-57, 9 U.S.P.Q. 1289, 1291 (Fed. Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1068 (1989) (citing the additional opinions in Pennwalt Corp.
v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988) as exhaustively discussing these competing policies)).
34 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608, 85 U.S.P.Q.
328, 330 (1950).
35 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14271992]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the body of knowledge through expired patents will continue to grow. That is,
the progress of science and useful arts will be promoted.
On the other hand, if patentees lose confidence in the system and choose
the secrecy option, yet the public has great confidence in the patent system,
then the number of new patents will dwindle. Consequently, the body of
knowledge through expired patents will stagnate. The progress of science and
useful arts will cease. In short, the progress of science and useful arts is related
to the confidence of patentees and inventors in the patent system; the progress
of science and useful arts is not related to the confidence of the public in the
patent system.
Second of all, the notice function appears to be a secondary function. For
example, as many as seven percent of the twenty-four million paper documents
on file at the Patent and Trademark Office may be missing at any one time.36
How important can the notice function be if the notice is as much as seven
percent deficient? Thus, the "protect the patentee function" is slightly more
important and should be given slightly more weight when the two policies
clash.
II. ESTABLISHING INFRINGEMENT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUIVALENTS
The doctrine of equivalents is very easy to understand. An accused device
infringes if it "performs substantially the same overall function or work, in
substantially the same way, to obtain substantially the same result as the
claimed invention." This is the Graver Tank "function-way-result" 37 test.
However, the doctrine of equivalents is an equitable doctrine38 and like many
equitable doctrines there are no bright lines determining what is an equivalent
and what is not.39 Therefore, while the doctrine of equivalents is easy to
36 Peggy A. Miller, Electronic Information Publishing: Old Issues in a New Industy:
U.S. Government as an Information Provider/Competitor, 187 PLIPAT 375, text on
WESTLAW, at *277 (1984).
37 This shorthand is used in many cases. E.g., Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc.,
952 F.2d 1320, 1326, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Perkin-Elmer Corp.,
822 F.2d at 1542, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1332 (Newman, J., dissenting).
3 8 E.g., Insta-Foam Prods., Inc. v. Universal Foam Sys., Inc., 906 F.2d 698, 702, 15
U.S.P.Q.2d 1295, 1297 (Fed Cir. 1990); Perkin-Elmer Corp., 822 F.2d at 1536, 3
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1327 (Newman, J., dissenting).
39 The absence of bright line tests affects many judicial areas:
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understand, application of the doctrine is somewhat difficult. This difficulty is
enhanced by the fact that even the members of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit cannot agree on its application. 40
One obvious prerequisite to the application of the doctrine of equivalents is
the absence of literal infringement. If every element of a claim literally reads on
the accused device, then the accused device literally infringes that claim and the
analysis ceases. 41
The boundary between judicial power and nullity should ... if possible, be a
bright line, so that very little thought is required to enable judges to keep inside it. If, on
the contrary, that boundary is vague and obscure, raising "questions of penumbra, of
shadowy marches," two bad consequences will ensue similar to those on the traffic
artery. Sometimes judges will be misled into trying lengthy cases and laboriously
reaching decisions which do not bind anybody. At other times, judges will be so fearful
of exceeding the uncertain limits of their powers that they will cautiously throw out
disputes which they really have capacity to settle, and thus justice which badly needs to
be done will be completely denied. Furthermore, an enormous amount of expensive
legal ability will be used up on jurisdictional issues when it could be much better spent
upon elucidating the merits of cases. In short, a trial judge ought to be able to tell easily
and fast what belongs in his court and what has no business there.
Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 375 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (dealing specifically with
subject matter jurisdiction) (quoting CHAFEE, THE THOMAS M. COOLEY LECruRES, SOME
PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 312 (1950) (quoting Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S.
403, 426 (1916) (Holmes, J., concurring))).
40 Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (en bane) (7-4 vote with sharp dissenting opinion filed by Bennett, Senior Circuit
Judge) (opinion expressing "additional views" in support of the majority filed by Nies,
Circuit Judge), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988). Pennwalt has the force of the en bane
majority; however, the consistent application of the doctrine of equivalents appears to be up
in the air. Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 959 F.2d 923, 923, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 2039,
2039 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Newman, Circuit Judge, dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc) ("MThe interpretation of the doctrine of equivalents will continue to depend on the
selection of the panel.").
41 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607, 85 U.S.P.Q.
328, 330 (1950); Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1560, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1031, 1037
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
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A. Specific Argument and Findings as to the Function-Way-Result Test
In general, the determination of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents is a question of fact. 42 Additionally, a jury verdict of infringement
by equivalents must be supported by substantial evidence.43
When an infringement by equivalents case is being tried before a jury, the
patentee must expressly compare the three Graver Tank elements of function,
way, and result of the claimed invention with the function, way, and result of
the accused device. 44 This is to "prevent the jury from being 'put to sea
without guiding charts,' and [to prevent the jury] from determining
infringement [by equivalents] by simply comparing the claimed invention and
the accused device 'as to overall similarity.'" 45 That is, in performing the
doctrine of equivalents analysis, merely comparing the "invention as a whole"
to the accused device is not proper.
This requirement that counsel for the patentee provide particularized
testimony and a linking argument for each of the Graver Tank prongs is not
mandated when the case is being tried before the United States International
42 E.g., Jonsson v. Stanley Works, 903 F.2d 812, 821, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1863, 1871
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Townsend Eng'g Co. v. HiTec Co., 829 F.2d 1086, 1089, 4
U.S.P.Q.2d 1136, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609, 85
U.S.P.Q. at 331).
43 E.g., Jurgens, 927 F.2d at 1557, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1035 (citing, e.g., Wahpeton
Canvas Co. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1552, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir.
1989)).
44 Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1323-24, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d
1161, 1163-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (quoting Lear-Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co., 873
F.2d 1422, 1425-26, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1767, 1770 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (citing Nestier Corp. v.
Menasha Corp., 739 F.2d 1576, 222 U.S.P.Q. 747 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1053 (1985)). "[IThe three Graver Tank elements [substantial identity of function, way
and result] must be presented in the form of particularized testimony and linking argument."
Id. "[A] patentee must prove substantial identity as to each of the function, way, and result
prongs of the doctrine of equivalents." Id. at 1166 (citing Lear-Siegler, 873 F.2d at 1425,
10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1770; Nester, 739 F.2d at 1579-80, 222 U.S.P.Q. at 750).
45 Malta, 952 F.2d at 1327, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1166 (quoting Lear-Siegler, 873 F.2d at
1426-27, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1770-71. The Federal Circuit expressly rejected the idea of
comparing the "invention as a whole" with the accused device to determine infringement by
equivalents. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (en bane), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
1430 [Vol. 53:1421
PA TENT INFRINGEMENT CHARGES
Trade Commission.46 "Unlike a jury in a district court case, the Commission
resolves disputes involving patent infringement matters with some regularity
and thus is aware of doctrine of equivalents jurisprudence." 47 Because district
court judges are also presumably aware of doctrine of equivalents
jurisprudence, the requirement might possibly be waived during bench trials.
Not surprisingly, just as a patentee must argue that the Graver Tank
function-way-result test is met, the court must specifically find that the Graver
Tank tripartite test was satisfied. 48 That is, a court must expressly find that the
accused device performs substantially the same function, in substantially the
same way, to achieve substantially the same result as the claimed invention to
hold that a claimed invention is infringed by equivalents. 49
B. All Elements Rule and Element-by-Element Analysis
The patentee's demonstration that the accused device, as a whole, performs
substantially the same function, in substantially the same way, to achieve
substantially the same result as the claimed invention is only the beginning of
the analysis. 50
When establishing literal infringement, a patentee must demonstrate that
every element of the disputed claim is found in the accused device.51 If only
one claim element is missing from the accused device, then the literal
infringement charge fails.52
Similarly, when establishing infringement by equivalents, the equivalent of
every disputed claim limitation must be found in the accused device.53 As one
court has phrased this "all elements rule," "'It is . . .well settled that each
46 Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 832-33, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
47 Id.
48 Conair Group, Inc. v. Automatik Apparate-Maschinenbau GmbH, 944 F.2d 862,
866, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1067 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (reversing district court order for a preliminary
injunction enjoining infringement because the district court asserted that infringement could
also be found under the doctrine of equivalents, without finding that the Graver Tank
tripartite analysis was satisfied).
49 Id. at 866, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1070.
50 Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934-35, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
1737, 1739-40 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
51 See supra note 19.
52 See supra note 19.
53 E.g., Pennwalt Corp., 833 F.2d at 934-35, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1739-40.
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element of a claim is material and essential, and that in order for a court to find
infringement, the plaintiff must show the presence of every element or its
substantial equivalent in the accused device.'" 54 In any given infringement by
equivalents case, probably some or most of the elements of the disputed claim
will be met literally. The remaining claim elements must be met equivalently.
Under this "element-by-element" analysis, each element of the asserted claim
must be met either literally or equivalently.
It thus follows that addition of functions to an accused device will not
defeat the patentee's protection. An accused device that includes, either literally
or equivalently, every element of the asserted claim cannot escape infringement
because it performs functions in addition to the claimed invention.55
C. Wat is an Equivalent?
The definition of an "equivalent" has been purposefully left fuzzy by the
Federal Circuit so the court may do equity under the doctrine. Even fuzzier is
whether an equivalent must have existed at the time of invention. Also unclear
is whether the range of equivalents depends on the "pioneer" or "non-pioneer"
status of the invention.
1. Defining an Element
A patentee bringing an infringement by equivalents charge will be hastily
met with summary judgment if the patentee fails to produce evidence
establishing that the limitations of the disputed claim are met equivalently by an
element of the accused device. 56 As part of providing particularized testimony
54 London v. Carson Pine Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1456,
1459 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (quoting Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551, 224
U.S.P.Q. 526, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
55 Insta-Foam Prod., Inc. v. Universal Foam Sys., Inc., 906 F.2d 698, 702, 15
U.S.P.Q.2d 1295, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837
F.2d 1044, 1057, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1434, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Adding features to an
accused device will not result in non-infringement if all the limitations in the claims, or
equivalents thereof, are present in the accused device.")).
56 Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1992). "Rule
56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment... against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element [i.e., factor] essential to that
party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. (quoting
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The patentee has the burden of
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and linking argument for each of the Graver Tank tripartite prongs,57 counsel
for the patentee must sufficiently explain "why" a given element of the accused
device is an equivalent of the corresponding claim limitation.58 A mere
assertion that an element of an accused device is an equivalent of the disputed
claim limitation will not suffice.59 This is an elusive and frustrating
requirement because the Federal Circuit has not, and probably will never, set
out a definitive formula for determining whether an element of an accused
device is a "substantial equivalent" of a claim limitation pertaining to a claim
element.60
While the Federal Circuit has not presented a cut and dried formula for
establishing whether an element of an accused device is a substantial equivalent
of a disputed claim limitation, 61 numerous "hints" may be found: (1) "'Proof
[of equivalence] can be made in any form: through testimony of experts or
others versed in the technology; by documents, including texts and treatises;
and, of course, by the disclosures of the prior art.'" 62 (2) One may apply the
proving at trial that a limitation of a disputed claim is met equivalently by an element of the
disputed device. Subpart I(E). As such, summary judgment is appropriate if no evidence of
equivalence is presented.
57 See supra subpart 1I(A).
58 Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1327, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161,
1166 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The dissent in Malta argues that the majority added the requirement
of explaining "why" the accused device is the equivalent of the claimed device. Thus, the
dissent argues, the majority added a fourth prong to the Graver Tank tripartite test. Id. at
1172 (Newman, J., dissenting). The majority and concurring opinions argue in rebuttal that
requiring the patentee to prove "why" the accused device is an equivalent of the claimed
device is actually only an elaboration on the requirement that the patentee prove the
substantial "way" prong of Graver Tank. Id. at 1167-69 (Michel, J., concurring).
59 Id. at 1166.
60 "Pennwalt did not set forth a test as to how one proves that an element is an accused
device is the 'substantial equivalent' of a claim limitation directed to a single element in
dispute ... ." Malta, 952 F.2d at 1325, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1165. The Federal Circuit
expressly declined to set out such a test in Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elect.
U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1260, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1962, 1968-69. (Fed. Cir. 1989). The
Malta Court also declined to elaborate a test, stating instead that "[h]ow equivalency to a
required limitation is met necessarily varies from case to case due to many variables such as
the form of the claim, the nature of the invention defined by it, the kind of limitation that is
not literally met, etc." Malta, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1165.
61 See supra note 60.
62 Coning Glass Works, 868 F.2d at 1261, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1969 (quoting Graver
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328, 331
(1950)). However, merely having an expert assert equivalency is clearly unacceptable.
Malta, 952 F.2d at 1325, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1166.
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Graver Tank tripartite analysis to the disputed claim element by proving that an
element of the accused device performs substantially the same function, in
substantially the same way, to achieve substantially the same result as the
disputed claim limitation. 63 (3) The prior art64 may be used to establish
equivalency. 65 The prior art may be used to demonstrate that one concept is the
equivalent of another concept without placing the patented concept into the
prior art. That is, the prior art can teach the equivalency without teaching the
patented concept. However, equivalency may not be used to help a patentee
ensnare the prior art. 66 (4) The interchangeability of a component of the
claimed device and a component of the accused device, although not dispositive
as to equivalency, 67 is clearly a factor in determining equivalency. 68 (5) A
63 Malta, 952 F.2d at 1325-26, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1165 (quoting Coning Glass Works,
868 F.2d at 1260, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1968-69 (while not the only way to show that a
structure in an accused device is the substantial equivalent of a claim limitation, the district
court's use of the function-way-result analysis with respect to a claim limitation is both
"helpful" and "acceptable")).
Generally, while the Graver Tank function-way-result analysis must be applied to the
claimed invention and the accused device, the Graver Tank function-way-result analysis
may be used to establish that an element of the accused device is a substantial equivalent of
a claim limitation.
64 Loosely speaking, "prior art" for a given invention includes patents, papers, and
devices (dealing with similar subject matter) that are published, known, used, or sold in this
country before either the patent application is filed or the invention or discovery is made.
See 1 LIPScOMa, supra note 12, §§ 4:10-:21, 4:52.
65 For example,
Pressure in a machine may be produced by a spring or by a weight; and where
that is so, the one is a mechanical equivalent of the other. Cases arise also where a: rod
and an endless chain will produce the same effect in a machine; and where that is so,
the constructor in operating under the patent may substitute the one for the other, and
still claim the protection which the patent confers. Exactly the same function in certain
cases may be accomplished by a lever or by a screw; and where that is so, the
substitution of the one for the other cannot be regarded as invention.
Imhaeuser v. Buerk, 101 U.S. 647, 656 (1879).
66 See infra subpart lI(E).
67 C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Kendall Co., 935 F.2d 280 (Table) (unpublished disposition, text
in WESTLAW, at *5 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("'[A]n interchangeable device is not necessarily an
equivalent device.'") (quoting Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444,
1449, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1806, 1810 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
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claim may have a broad range of equivalents with respect to one limitation and
a narrow range of equivalents with respect to another limitation.69
2. Existence of Equivalency at the 7ime of Infringement
Under Federal Circuit precedent built on Atlas Powder Co. v. E.L du Pont
de Nemours & Co.,70 an equivalent clearly need not have existed at the time
the invention was made.71 Thus, equivalents may be found in subsequently
developed technology. 72
However, Atlas and subsequent cases did not discuss older and
unambiguous United States Supreme Court precedents that held that an
equivalent must indeed have existed at the time of invention. 73
68 Id. (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609, 85
U.S.P.Q. 328, 331 (1950)).
69 John D. Brush & Co., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 928 F.2d 411
(Table), 12 I.T.R.D. 2568, text in WESTLAW, at *5 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
70 750 F.2d 1569, 1580-81, 224 U.S.P.Q. 409, 416-17 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
71 E.g., Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558,
1563, 231 U.S.P.Q. 833, 835 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
72 E.g., Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 941-42 n.4, 4
U.S.P.Q.2d 1737, 1745 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en bane) (Bennett, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part) (citing Atlas Powder Co., 750 F.2d at 1581, 224 U.S.P.Q. at 417, cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988)).
73 The idea of giving pioneer inventions a broader range of equivalents is over a
century old:
Mere formal alterations in a combination in letters patent, however, are no defense
to the charge of infringement, and the withdrawal of one ingredient from the same and
the substitution of another which was well known at the date of the patent as a proper
substitute for the one withdrawn, is a mere formal alteration of the combination if the
ingredient substituted performs substantially the same function as the one withdrawn.
Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 556 (1870) (emphasis added). The doctrine
of equivalents is not available "if the ingredient substituted was a new one, or performs a
substantially different function, or was not known at the date of the patent as a proper
substitute for the one omitted from his patented combination." Gould v. Rees, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 187, 194 (1872) (emphasis added). "By an equivalent . . . it is meant that the
ingredient substituted for the one withdrawn performs the same function as the other, and
that it was well known at the date of the patent securing the invention as proper substitute
for the one omitted in the patented combination." Gill v. Wells 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 1, 28
(1874) (emphasis added).
1992] 1435
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The Federal Circuit's apparent abandonment of the Supreme Court
precedents is best understood when looked at in reverse chronological order.
The Atlas court stated that "[i]t is not a requirement of equivalence . . . that
those skilled in the art know of the equivalence when the patent application is
filed or the patent issues." 74 Although the Atlas court cited Hughes Aircraft
Co. v. United States75 and American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Travenol Labs,
Inc.76 as supporting that proposition, 77 these two cases do not directly support
the Atlas holding. American Hospital states that "[a]n appropriate range of
equivalents may extend to post-invention advances in the art in an appropriate
case. "78 American Hospital also relies on Hughes.79 Hughes states, "[a]s one
of our predecessor courts, the Court of Claims, has thrice made clear, that
partial variation in technique, an embellishment made possible by [after patent-
date] technology, does not allow the accused [device] to escape the 'web of
infringement."' 80 Apparently, the Atlas panel sought fit to remove the above
italicized limitations, holding that any development may be an equivalent,
regardless of whether it was known at the date of patent. Thus, while allowing
gradual variations, the Federal Circuit common-law on this issue is now
squarely at odds with older Supreme Court precedents.
Although the older Supreme Court decisions seem to have been abandoned
in favor of the recent Federal Circuit jurisprudence, the recent Federal Circuit
decision in the case of Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp. 8' reveals
that this issue is far from resolved. In Faytex, the panel declined to follow the
recent Federal Circuit decision in Scripps ainic & Research Foundation v.
74 Atlas Powder Co., 750 F.2d at 1581, 224 U.S.P.Q. at 417.
75 717 F.2d 1351, 219 U.S.P.Q. 473 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
76 745 F.2d 1, 223 U.S.P.Q. 577 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
7 7 Atlas Powder Co., 750 F.2d at 1581, 224 U.S.P.Q. at 417.
7 8 American Hosp., 745 F.2d at 9, 223 U.S.P.Q. at 583 (emphasis added).
79 Id.
80 Hughes, 717 F.2d 1351, 1365, 219 U.S.P.Q. 473, 483 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (emphasis
added) (citing Bendix Corp. v. United States, 600 F.2d 1364, 1382, 204 U.S.P.Q. 617, 631
(Ct. Cl. 1979) ("The mere fact that the accused [device] may be more sophisticated ...
does not allow the accused [device] to escape the web of infringement" (citations omitted));
Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1080-81, 191 U.S.P.Q. 439, 447-48 (Ct. CI.
1976) ("[M]erely because the accused system is an improvement over the patented system
does not also mean that it does not infringe the [claims ofl the patent." (citation omitted));
Eastern Rotorcraft Corp. v. United States, 397 F.2d 978, 981, 154 U.S.P.Q. 43, 45 (Ct.
Cl. 1968) ("That the [accused] device involves an additional element does not avoid
infringement" (citations omitted)).
81 970 F.2d 834, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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Genentech, Inc.82 and, instead, followed several century-old Supreme Court
cases that the Scripps panel did not address. 83
Similar to the Scripps decision, the Federal Circuit decisions stating that an
equivalent may include subsequently developed technologies apparently did not
address the older Supreme Court decisions. Therefore, although Federal Circuit
precedents appear to have expanded the range of equivalents to include
subsequent developments in technology, a contrary argument may be based on
firm Supreme Court precedents. The Federal Circuit should expressly state
whether these older Supreme Court precedents have been abandoned, or
whether these will, for example, be limited to "a combination" patent. 84
3. The Pioneer/Non-Pioneer Status of the Invention
Under Supreme Court precedents, a pioneer invention should be accorded
a wider range of equivalents than a slight improvement in a crowded field:
It is well settled that a greater degree of liberality and a wider range of
equivalents are permitted where the patent is of a pioneer character than when
the invention is simply an improvement, maybe the last and successful step, in
the art theretofore partially developed by other inventors in the same field.85
82 927 F.2d 1565, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
83 Faytex, 970 F.2d at 838-39 n.2, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1485 n.2. The court explained:
This court in Scripps Clinic ruled without reference to the Supreme Court's previous
cases .... A decision that fails to consider Supreme Court precedent does not control
if the court determines that the prior panel would have reached a different conclusion if
it had considered controlling precedent." See Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035
n.7 (11th Cir. 1987).
Id.
84 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
85 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 415 (1908)
(quoting Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v. American Fur Ref. Co., 198 U.S. 399, 406 (1905)).
The same court elaborated:
The right view is expressed in Miller v. Eagle Manufacturing Company, 151 U.S. 186,
207, as follows: "The range of equivalents depends upon the extent and nature of the
invention. If the invention is broad and primary in its character, the range of equivalents
will be correspondingly broad, under the liberal construction which the courts give to
such inventions." And this was what was decided in Kokomo Fence Machine
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Thus, a non-pioneer patent-one in a crowded field-should be given a
narrower range of equivalents than the same invention that revolutionized or
created a field.
The Federal Circuit has not uniformly addressed the pioneer/non-pioneer
issue. The starting point, of course, is Graver Tank. "In applying the doctrine
of equivalents, the fact finder must determine the range of equivalents to which
the claimed invention is entitled, in light of the prosecution history, the
pioneer/non-pioneer status of the invention, and the prior art." 86 However,
from that common starting ground, the opinions diverge. Some opinions are
still written under the principle that a pioneer invention is "entitled to a broad
range of equivalents." 87 However, a trial court will apparently not be reversed
if it fails to expressly consider the pioneer/non-pioneer status of an invention. 88
One court even went so far as to say that the "finding of equivalence does not
depend on the status of the invention as a 'pioneer.'" 89 Another court
dismissed the pioneer/non-pioneer distinction as "ancient jurisprudence. "9
Case. . . Cimioti Unhairing Company v. American Fur Ref. Company, ... and
Computing Scale Co. v. Automatic Scale Company, 204 U.S. 609....
It is manifest, therefore, that... the range of equivalents depends upon and varies
with the degree of invention. See Ives et al. v. Hamilton, Executor, 92 U.S. 426; Hoyt
v. Home, 145 U.S. 302; Deering v. Winona Harvester Works, 155 U.S. 286; Walker
on Patents, § 362; Robinson on Patents, § 258.
Id. at 414, 415.
This doctrine was widely applied and stood on firm footing. "No question is made but
that plaintiffs invention was broadly new, a pioneer in its line, and the patent entitled to a
broad construction and the claims to a liberal application of the doctrine of equivalent. See
Brothers v. Lidgerwood Mfg. Co., 223 Fed. 359, 138 C. C. A. 460." Brothers v. United
States, 250 U.S. 88, 89 (1919).
86 D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1575, 225 U.S.P.Q. 236, 239 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (emphasis added) (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339
U.S. 605, 610, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328, 330 (1950)).
87 Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532, 3
U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
88 Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 863 F.2d 855, 861 n.15, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d 1289, 1294 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
89 Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1261 n.7, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d 1962, 1970 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
90 Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 987, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d
1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[T]he 'pioneer' is not a separate class of invention, carrying
a unique body of law.").
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The consideration of pioneer/non-pioneer status seems to have been
absorbed by the idea that the doctrine of equivalents may not be used by a
patentee to ensnare the prior art. 91 As previously mentioned, 92 although not
technically correct, the doctrine of equivalents may be thought of as expanding
the claims. A pioneer invention will usually stand alone; that is, there will be
no prior art that even comes close to it. Thus, in general there is adequate room
to expand the claims of a pioneer invention; moderate claim expansion will not
ensnare the prior art.
On the other hand, in a crowded field, the gap between the claimed
material and the prior art will be slight. Each subsequent patentee in any given
field carves out a piece of the patentable material between others' patents and
the prior art. Thus, the claims defining patents in a crowded field have little
room to expand; any expansion will ensnare the prior art. Thus, the idea that
the range of equivalent depends on the pioneer/non-pioneer status of the
invention parallels and possibly duplicates the idea that a patentee may not
engulf the prior art.9 3
The recently decided Faxtex decision 94 makes it clear that unless properly
addressed, the older Supreme Court decisions may be the basis for a strong
argument that the pioneer or non-pioneer status of a patent carries weight.
Thus, although a patent's pioneer/non-pioneer status and its effect on the range
of equivalents seems to duplicate or parallel the policy that a patentee may not
91 See supra subpart II(E).
92 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
93 This seems to have been the rationale behind the dismissal of the pioneer/non-
pioneer idea in Sun Studs, 872 F.2d at 987, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1346 ("The wide range of
technological advance between pioneering breakthrough and modest improvement
accommodates gradations in scope of equivalency."). Apparently the same rationale was
used by the Federal Circuit in Texas Instruments v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 846
F.2d 1369, 1370, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1886, 1888 (Fed. Cir. 1988):
The judicially "liberal" view of both claim interpretation and equivalency accorded a
"pioneer" invention, see Morley Sewing Machine Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U.S. 263, 9 S.
Ct. 299, 32 L.Ed. 715 (1889), is not a manifestation of a different legal standard based
on an abstract legal concept denominated "pioneer". Rather, the "liberal" view flows
directly from the relative sparseness of prior art in nascent fields of technology ....
However, even its "pioneer" status does not change the way infringement is
determined. The patentee's disclosure, the prosecution history, and the prior art still
provide the background against which the scope of claims is determined.
94 See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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engulf the prior art, the Federal Circuit should clear up this matter by expressly
stating whether a patent's pioneer/ non-pioneer status is relevant or irrelevant.
D. No Requirement of One-To-One Correspondence
To establish infringement by equivalents, an equivalent for every claim
limitation must be found in the accused device95 and proven to be a substantial
equivalent.96 However, the element-by-element analysis does not require a one-
to-one correspondence between components of the accused device and those
disclosed in the patent. 97 For example, three components in the claimed
invention, each corresponding to an element of the claim, may be substituted
by a single component in the accused device, corresponding to all three of the
claim elements. Thus, under the doctrine of equivalents, there is no
requirement of a structure corresponding to each claim limitation.
One source of confusion is the use of similar terms when analyzing
"means-plus-function" claims. 98 Unlike applying the doctrine of equivalents to
a "standard" claim, to be an "equivalent" and thus establish infringement of a
means-plus-function claim, the accused device must have a structure
corresponding to the means-plus-function claim limitation. 99 There is no such
requirement for an "equivalent" under the doctrine of equivalents.
95 See supra subpart 11(B).
96 See supra subpart 1(C)(1).
97 Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 832, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1991). "An equivalent must be found for every
limitation of the claim somewhere in the accused device, but not necessarily in a
corresponding component." Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868
F.2d 1251, 1259, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1962, 1968 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
98 35 U.S.C. § 112. An analysis under this statute involves a definition of the word
"equivalent" that differs from the definition used under a doctrine of equivalents analysis.
See D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1575, 225 U.S.P.Q. 236, 239 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
99 This acts like a reverse doctrine of equivalents, limiting the scope of protection of
the means-plus-function claim limitation. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833
F.2d 931, 962, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737, 1762 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en bane), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 961 (1988).
1440 [Vol. 53:1421
PATENT INFRINGEMENT CHARGES
E. Range of Equivalents May Not Ensnare the Prior Art
The "invention as a whole" analytical doctrine, rejected by the Federal
Circuit, 100 still has a place in the doctrine of equivalents analysis. One great
limitation on the application of the doctrine of equivalents is that the invention
as a whole, when looked at from an equivalency standpoint, may not "ensnare
the prior art."101 "[A] patentee should not be able to obtain, under the doctrine
of equivalents, coverage that he could not lawfully have obtained from the
[Patent and Trademark office] by literal claims." 102 The prior art always limits
what an inventor may claim.103 Therefore, the prior art limits the range of
permissible equivalents.1 04 The prior art may prevent infringement by
equivalents even if every limitation of an asserted claim is literally or
equivalently present in an accused device. 105
The patentee must prove that the range of equivalents being sought would
not ensnare the prior art. 1°6 In general, a patentee has the burden of proving
patent claim infringement. 107 Placing the burden of proving nonencroachment
into the prior art onto the patentee is merely an extension of this long-standing
burden of proving infringement. 10 8
Using a hypothetical claim analysis' 09 is a helpful, but not mandatory, 11 0
way for the patentee to meet the burden of proving that the range of equivalents
sought does not ensnare the prior art. This analysis involves "visualizing a
hypothetical patent claim, sufficient in scope to literally cover the accused
product. The pertinent question then becomes whether that hypothetical claim
10 0 See supra note 45.
101 Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 685, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d 1942, 1948-49 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 537 (1990).
10 2 Id. at 684, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1948.
103 E.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1988).
104 Id.
105 Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1561, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1031, 1037 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
106 Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 685, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d 1942, 1948-49 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Under Sea Indus., Inc. v. Dacor Corp.,
833 F.2d 1551, 1557, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1772, 1776 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
107 E.g., Under Sea Indus., Inc., 833 F.2d at 1557, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1776..
108 Wilson Spori'ng Goods, 904 F.2d at 685, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1949.
109 Id. at 684, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1948.
110 Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1449, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d
1806, 1810 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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could have been allowed by the PTO over the prior art." 111 This "analysis
does not envision application of a full-blown patentability analysis to a
hypothetical claim," 112 but merely recommends using the hypothetical claim to
narrow the focus of the analysis to the matter at hand. 113
If the hypothetical claim would not have been allowed over the prior art,
then "it would be improper to permit the patentee to obtain that coverage." 14
On the other hand, if the hypothetical claim would have been allowed over the
prior art, then the "prior art is not a bar to infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents."115
F. Prosecution History Estoppel as a Bar
Prosecution history estoppel, 116 like the prior art, limits the range of
equivalents permitted in an infringement by equivalents suit. The doctrine of
equivalents may not be used by the patentee to exclude others from making,
selling, or using art surrendered during the prosecution of the patent. The "file
wrapper" is the history of an inventor's prosecution of the application. The file
wrapper includes relevant prosecution history, such as amendments, statements,
and replies made to obtain a patent. For example, an examiner in the PTO may
reject a claim as being unpatentable over the prior art. The inventor may then
narrow the scope of the claim by adding limitations to the claim. The
examiner's rejection and the inventor's corresponding changes to the claim
language become part of the file wrapper. If the changed claim is litigated, the
patentee is bound by the changed language and cannot assert that the claim is
really broader than the patentee and the examiner agreed it would be. The
patentee is estopped from asserting that the claim is broader than the
prosecution history, as recorded by the file wrapper, indicates.
The doctrine of equivalents may not be used by the patentee to exclude
others from making, selling, or using art surrendered during the prosecution of
111 Wilson Sport'ng Goods, 904 F.2d at 684, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1948.
112 Key Mfg. Group, 925 F.2d at 1449, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1810.
113 How this differs from a "full-blown" patentability analysis in unclear.
114 Wilson Sport'ng Goods, 904 F.2d at 684, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1948.
115 Id.
116 Prosecution history estoppel is also known as "file wrapper estoppel" in some
cases. E.g., jonsson v. Stanley Works, 903 F.2d 812, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1863 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
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the patent.'1 7 However, the fact that a claim was amended does not
automatically preclude an application of the doctrine of equivalents. "Whenever
prosecution history estoppel is invoked as a limitation to infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents, a close examination must be made as to, not only what
was surrendered, but also the reason for such a surrender.'" 118 Amendments
may be of different types and may serve different functions. Depending on the
nature and purpose of an amendment it may have a limiting effect within a
spectrum ranging from great to small to zero." 119
III. INFRINGEMENT BY EQUIVALENTS AS THE SECOND PRONG
The constitutional "protect the patentee function" of the doctrine of
equivalents is in direct conflict with the "provide notice to the people function"
of the United States patent system. 120 When confronted with expanding the
protection beyond the scope of the claims, the "provide notice to the people
function" usually prevails. As such, literal infringement is the mainstay of the
United States patent system protection, and the doctrine of equivalents is "the
exception [and] not the rule."121 As stated recently by the Federal Circuit, if
"the doctrine of equivalents is simply the second prong of every infringement
charge,... then claims will cease to serve their intended purpose. Competitors
will never know whether their actions infringe a granted patent."' 22
Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons why the doctrine of equivalents
should be the second prong of every patent infringement charge.
117 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABurry,
VALIDrrYAND INFRaNGEMNT § 18.05 (1991).
118 Insta-Foam Products, Inc. v. Universal Foam Systems, Inc., 906 F.2d 698, 703,
15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1295, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (quoting Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Duphar
Int'l Research, 738 F.2d 1237, 1243, 222 U.S.P.Q. 649, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
119 Id. at 703, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1298 (quoting Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,
717 F.2d 1351, 1363, 219 U.S.P.Q. 473, 481 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
120 See supra subpart 1(D).
121 London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1456,
1459 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
12 2 Id. at 1538, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1459.
19921 1443
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
A. The Doctrine of Equivalents Should be Expanded
The Graver Tank Court speaks in terms of protecting patentees from
"piracy," "fraud," and "stealing." 123 This is a worthy goal, because the
promotion of the "Progress of Science and useful Arts" 124 is served more by
the protection of inventors than by the comfortable feeling the rest of the public
has by receiving notice that its actions potentially infringe.' 2 5 If the inventors
are not protected they may choose to keep their inventions secret rather than
disclosing them through the patent system. If that occurs, the promotion of "the
Progress of Science and useful Arts" will fall to the side because the body of
public domain knowledge, in the form of expired patents, will cease to grow.
If literal infringement becomes the only option, a prospective "copyist"
must merely read the patent and make insubstantial changes, barely avoiding
the literal language of the claims, to impermissibly steal the invention. It is the
123 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 612, 85
U.S.P.Q. 328, 330 (1950) (Black, J. dissenting).
124 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, CI. 8.
125 See supra subpart I(D). Japan is also a good example of why the doctrine of
equivalents is so important. Japan has virtually no doctrine of equivalents. Robert Greene
Sterne & Edward J. Kessler, Patent Protection for Computer-Related Technology: An
International Strategy, 292 PI/PAT 23, text on WESTLAW, at *23. ("Japan has no
doctrine of equivalents in the way this term is defined in the United States.... Trhe scope
of protection obtained in Japan does not extend much beyond the claim language, if at
all."); Charles R.B. Macedo, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the International
Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 193, text on WESTLAW, at 422
("Both the U.S. and European systems tend to interpret claims broadly, while the Japanese
tend to interpret claims narrowly."); Takashi Ishida, Helpfid Hints to Effective Japanese
Patent Protection, 319 PLI/PAT 93, text on WESTLAW, at *56:
In Japan, the... doctrine of equivalency [sic] may be said to be a weapon for the
patentee to attack others in an infringement case, but in Japan, there are few cases
where it has been successfully applied in practice. There are scattered examples of
decisions of district courts recognizing equivalency being overturned in appeals and
these appeal [sic] decisions being supported at the Supreme Court.
This lack of the doctrine of equivalents seriously hampers the patentee's protection.
Bernarr R. Pravel, Why the United States Should Adopt the First-to-File System for Patents,
22 ST. MARY's L.J. 797, 807 (1991) ("[IThe doctrine of equivalents... is not available in
most countries, including Japan. Thus, foreign patents are often so restricted in their
protection that they are of insignificant or no value.").
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ease of copying patented inventions that allows a court, confronted with two
virtually identical devices, to "properly infer that the accused [concept] is the
result of imitation rather than experimentation or invention." 126 Intent is not a
factor. Thus, although the Graver Tank goals of the doctrine of equivalents
speak to the prevention of intentional misuse, the application of the doctrine in
fact parallels the literal infringement doctrine from which the doctrine of
equivalents originated. 127
However, an accused infringer may offer evidence that the patented
concept was not stolen, pirated, or fraudulently obtained. 128 If this defense
becomes widely accepted, the fears of making infringement by equivalents the
second prong may be allayed. If those accused of infringement by equivalents
are permitted to prove that independent research was the source of the accused
device, then the doctrine of equivalents may be comfortably expanded to give
the patentee greater protection, thereby promoting the progress of science,
without punishing those who neither stole, nor pirated, nor practiced fraud on
an invention.
Our system encourages others to copy the ideas in patents by "designing
around" 12 9 the claims of the patent in the name of promoting the progress of
126 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 612, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 332.
127 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(b), (c) (1988) (intent is irrelevant with respect to literal
infringement).
128 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 611, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 331 ("And the record contains no
evidence of any kind to show that [the accused concept] was developed as the result of
independent research or experiments.").
129 Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1842,
1845-46 (Fed. Cir. 1991):
Intentional "designing around" the claims of a patent is not by itself a wrong which
must be compensated by invocation of the doctrine of equivalents. Designing around
patents is, in fact, one of the ways the patent system works to the advantage of the
public in promoting progress in the useful arts, its constitutional purpose.";
Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citations
omitted):
We have often noted that one of the benefits of the patent system is the incentive it
provides for "designing around" patented inventions, thus creating new
innovations.... Of course, determining when a patented device has been "designed
around" enough to avoid infringement is a difficult determination to make. One cannot
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science and useful arts. Allowing others to design around patent claims clearly
promotes their progress; however, at what point does this encouraged,
permissible copying become impermissible infringement that deters inventors
from revealing their inventions to society in exchange for protection? "The
question which thus emerges is whether. . the change [between the patented
formula and the accused formula] was so insubstantial that the trial court's
invocation of the doctrine of equivalents was justified." 130
How insubstantial must the change be between a patented device and an
accused device? The Federal Circuit rightfully refuses to provide a bright line
test.1 31 What is the necessary quantum of difference? One court defined the
difference as follows: a "substantial change" does not infringe; an
"insubstantial change" does infringe by equivalents. 132 Clearly the prior art
will provide a boundary as to what will be excluded as an equivalent. But
should the claim be allowed to expand to fill the entire gap between the claim's
literal terms and the prior art?
If the promotion of the progress of science and the useful arts is indeed
best served by enhancing the protection function of the doctrine of equivalents,
thereby slightly subordinating the notice function of the claims, then the
doctrine of equivalents should become the second prong of every infringement
charge.
One way to minimize the negative effect on the notice function, while
enhancing the protection function, is by not allowing damages for infringement
by equivalents for acts that occur before the accused infringer is put on actual
notice of such infringement. The Federal Circuit could limit the remedies for
infringement by equivalents to an injunction and damages for any infringing
activities committed after the party is put on actual notice of such infringement.
Additionally, the idea that an "innocent" infringer is not liable for such
infringement, outlined in the previous section, could be combined with the idea
presented immediately above. An innocent infringer would not be liable for
know for certain that changes are sufficient to avoid infringement until a judge or jury
has made that determination.
Designing around a patent involves examining the patent, then purposefully designing a
device that avoids infringing the patent claims either literally or under the doctrine of
equivalents.
130 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 610, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 331.
131 See supra subpart I(C)(1).
132 London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1456,
1458 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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damages for infringement by equivalents caused by acts that occurred before
the innocent infringer was put on actual notice of such infringement.
B. How The Doctrine of Equivalents Could be Limited
If the Federal Circuit is determined to limit the application of the doctrine
of equivalents, several ways are available. The doctrine of equivalents itself is a
very limited doctrine. Part II of this Note illustrates how much the doctrine is
constricted by its definition. Thus, one method of keeping the doctrine of
equivalents from becoming the second prong 133 of every patent infringement
charge is merely to enforce the doctrine as it is currently defined.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a second method.
The first time counsel is sanctioned under Rule 11 for not even arguing that a
claim limitation is equivalently met by an accusing device, the number of
doctrine of equivalent "second prongs" probably will diminish significantly.
But surely the Federal Circuit was not referring to improperly pleaded or
argued infringement by equivalents charges when it stated the above policy.
A third method may be used to limit the application of the doctrine of
equivalents. The Graver Tank Court defines the objective of the doctrine in
terms of protecting patentees from "piracy," "fraud," and "stealing." 13 4 The
Winans Court dealt directly with the case of a defendant walking into the
plaintiff's shop and virtually stealing the plaintiff's invention. 135 A way to limit
greatly the application of the doctrine would be to make the patentee allege and
prove either piracy, fraud, or stealing to meet an equitable threshold. A recent
Federal Circuit decision recognized the absence of any "evidence showing an
equitable basis for invoking the doctrine of equivalents." 136 Another recent
Federal Circuit decision states that the doctrine of equivalents must be confined
to "its proper equitable role." 137 Thus, by requiring patentees to make a
showing sufficient to invoke the equity-based doctrine, the Graver Tank
objective of the doctrine could be met and the Federal Circuit would never
have to worry about the doctrine becoming the second prong of every patent
infringement charge. If the Federal Circuit chooses this third option to limit the
doctrine, then evidence that an accused infringer attempted to design around the
133 Id.
134 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 610, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 330.
135 Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 332 (1853).
136 ilinois Tool Works Inc. v. Rawplug Co., 975 F.2d 868 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
137 Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d 1526, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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claimed invention should allow the patentee to meet the requisite equitable
threshold. Clearly the Winans-type smoking gun is rare and designing around
patent claims too closely is the type of wrong from which the Graver Tank
Court sought to protect patentees.
C. Infringement by Equivalents Should be the Second Prong
The fear that infringement by equivalents may become the second prong of
every infringement charge 138 is not a legitimate fear. The real fear is that the
doctrine would become the first and only prong of most patent infringement
charges. Although the Federal Circuit rightfully refuses to define a bright line
test for equivalency, 139 it is apparently unable to live with the uncertainty that a
fuzzy definition naturally causes.
Infringement by equivalents should be the second prong of every patent
infringement charge, because an infringement by the equivalents second prong
is the natural result of the fuzzy definition of an equivalent. Infringement is
made out when every claim limitation is met either literally or equivalently.
The doctrine of equivalents effectively broadens the patent claims. 140
Therefore, if counsel can allege, with Rule 11 in mind, that every claim
limitation is met literally, then that counsel can surely, even fearlessly, argue
that every claim limitation is met either literally or equivalently. Furthermore,
if the parties have proceeded to the litigation stage with respect to literal
infringement, then the claims will be interpreted and the accused device will be
compared to the disputed claims. 14 1 An equivalency analysis seems but a small
addition to this process.
However, saying that infringement by equivalents should be the second
prong of every patent infringement charge does not mean that every plaintiff
will necessarily succeed. The doctrine can become the second prong and
remain an exception to the rule. That is, complaints can regularly sound in both
literal infringement and infringement by equivalents without making extended
protection regularly available.
The Federal Circuit should really fear that infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents will be the first and only prong of most patent infringement
charges. For example, if a complaint sounds only in infringement by
138 See supra note 122.
139 See supra subpart II(C)(1).
140 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
141 SSIH Equip. S.A. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 376, 218,
U.S.P.Q. 678, 688 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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equivalents, or if the literal infringement prong is disposed of by an early
summary judgment, then litigators have only the fuzzy definition of an
equivalent with which to contend. Because litigants will have no bright lines to
guide them, the issue of infringement by equivalents will nearly always be
arguable. With only the doctrine of equivalents to argue, an attitude of "when
in doubt, bring suit" will arise as one extreme logical result of the fuzzy
definition of an equivalent. Thus, if the doctrine of equivalents becomes the one
and only infringement charge, then the fuzzy definition of equivalency will be a
source of increased litigation.
As long as the doctrine of equivalents remains subordinated to the literal
infringement doctrine, the fuzzy definition serves the system well. When and if
infringement by equivalents routinely becomes the first and only prong of
patent infringement charges, the Federal Circuit should act to brighten the line
between equivalency and non-equivalency. Until then, the definition is
workable and the added protection for patentees, made possible by the
flexibility in the definition, is well worth having infringement by equivalents as
the second prong of every patent infringement charge.
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
The Federal Circuit has made great strides in firming up the doctrine of
equivalents: much of the doctrine is now concrete and the rightfully fuzzy
definition of an equivalent serves the equity-based doctrine well. However,
several issues must be cleared up by the Federal Circuit when appropriate cases
arise. The court should address whether it has "overruled" Supreme Court
precedents requiring the existence of an equivalent at the time of invention.
Furthermore, the Court should definitively state whether the pioneer or non-
pioneer status of a patent is a factor in determining the range of equivalents or,
possibly, whether this principle has merged with the principle that a patentee
may not ensnare the prior art. Until clarified, these wrongfully fuzzy areas
cloud the validity of the rightfully fuzzy definition of an equivalent.
The Federal Circuit is worried about the doctrine of equivalents becoming
the second prong of every patent infringement charge. The doctrine of
equivalents should be the second prong of every patent infringement charge.
The real worry is if and when the doctrine of equivalents becomes the first and
only prong of patent infringement charges. For now, judicious application of
the rightfully fuzzy definition of an equivalent will keep the doctrine in check,
while granting the protection that patentees need.
Sean T. Moorhead
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